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Abstract   This article characterizes anticipated changes in fleet structure, vessel 
harvesting activity, and economic performance in the Pacific Coast groundfish fish-
ery under an individual fishing quota management program. Results suggest that the 
current fleet of 117 vessels will be reduced by roughly 50%–66% to 40–-60 vessels, 
resulting in annual cost savings of $18–$22 million (based on 2004 price and cost 
estimates). However, cost savings could be significantly less if restrictions on quota 
trading across vessels are incorporated into the program design. Alternative modes 
of collecting fees to fund program administration and their impact on fleet size and 
total fishery value are also studied. We conclude that a program of individual fishing 
quotas, if carefully designed, can be an attractive alternative for management of the 
Pacific Coast groundfish fishery.
Key words   Individual fishing quotas, scale and technical efficiency, fleet restructuring.
JEL Classification Codes   Q2, D24.
Introduction
The Pacific Coast groundfish fishery (PCGF) is currently managed under a controlled 
access program. Commercial harvesting activities are regulated with vessel entry re-
strictions, gear restrictions, area closures, seasonal closures, and bimonthly (per-vessel) 
catch limits. These regulations are required to prevent overfishing of groundfish stocks, 
in particular species which have been identified as overfished or subject to overfishing. 
Controlled access management does not align fleet harvesting capacity with catch targets, 
is costly to administer, and in the case of Pacific groundfish introduces incentives to dis-
card fish at sea (Branch, Rutherford, and Hilborn 2006). Overall, the controlled access 
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program has not met key management objectives, which in turn has prompted calls for an 
alternative management approach that might improve economic and biological conditions 
in the fishery.
 In this article, we examine the economic implications of adopting an individual fish-
ing quota (IFQ) management program for the limited entry trawl component of the PCGF, 
which accounts for about 70% (on an ex-vessel revenue basis) of the groundfish landed 
on the Pacific Coast (California, Oregon, and Washington) of the United States. Our spe-
cific goal is to provide an ex ante estimate of changes in fleet structure and profitability 
that are expected if controlled access is replaced by IFQs. For reasons of data availabil-
ity, we focus our analysis on the non-whiting component of the limited entry trawl fleet, 
which hereafter for simplicity is referred as the groundfish fleet.1
 This analysis is particularly timely because the Pacific Fishery Management Council 
voted to begin consideration of an IFQ program for the Pacific Coast limited entry trawl 
groundfish fishery in 2003 and recommended trawl rationalization through an IFQ pro-
gram in November 2008. At the June 2009 meeting, the Council completed a series of 
trailing actions on eligibility to own quota, accumulation limits, a set aside for adaptive 
management, and miscellaneous clarifications. Over the remainder of 2009, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service is expected to begin drafting regulations, and Council staff will 
finalize the draft amendments package. Fishing is expected to begin under IFQs in 2011.
 The conceptual approach follows recent work by Weninger and Waters (2003) and 
Singh, Weninger, and Doyle (2006). In a first step, we use data on operating expenses and 
catch of groundfish vessel operations to estimate the cost inefficiency under the current 
management program and calibrate vessel level harvesting costs for simulation purposes. 
Exploiting the economic incentives implicit in IFQ operating rules for groundfish trawl-
ers, we use the calibrated costs to predict the number and type (length class) of vessels 
expected to participate in an IFQ-managed groundfish fishery. The analysis allows us to 
estimate cost savings and resource rents expected to emerge in the PCgF, and also predict 
the vessel length classes that are most likely to remain active under IFQ management.2
 Our results suggest that (with landings held at 2004 levels) the current groundfish 
fleet, which consisted of 117 vessels in 2004, will be reduced by roughly 50–66% to 
40–60 vessels under an IFQ program. The reduction in fleet size implies cost savings of 
$18–$22 million for the year 2004 (most recent year of the data). Vessels that remain ac-
tive will, on average, be more cost efficient and will benefit from economies of scale that 
are currently unexploited under controlled access regulations in the fishery. The cost sav-
ings estimates are significant, amounting to 60% of costs incurred currently, suggesting 
that IFQ management may be an attractive option for the PCGF. We find that mid-sized 
boats, 60-70 feet in length, are relatively cost efficient and therefore most likely to remain 
active under the IFQ management program; smaller (40–50 feet) and larger vessels (80 
feet and above) are likely to exit the fishery.
 Our analysis reveals, however, that projected cost savings are sensitive to the design 
elements of the IFQ program. In particular, we show that restrictions on the total quota that 
can be harvested by individual vessels, or restrictions on quota trading across vessel length 
classes, can significantly reduce the estimated benefits (cost savings) of switching to IFQs. 
Our estimates suggest that benefits decline by roughly $3.80 million (18.4%) per year if a 
1% cap on quota ownership at the vessel level is imposed, and by as much as $2.14 million 
(10.4%) per year under restrictions on harvest permit trading across vessel classes.
 Results further show that program design elements have implications for the capital 
types and vessel length classes that will remain active in an IFQ-managed groundfish 
1 The regulatory regime in other portions of the Pacific Coast groundfish fishery, including the limited entry fixed-gear 
fleet and the open-access fleet, is assumed to remain unchanged. We do not consider changes to the whiting fishery.
2 Our model predicts equilibrium fleet structures and economic rent under IFQ management. The transition from 
current conditions to IFQ-equilibrium conditions are likely to take time. An analysis of this transition period is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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fishery. As one might expect, tight harvest quotas on individual vessels favor smaller 
boats due to their lower fixed costs of operation. Restrictions on permit trading across 
vessel classes will keep vessels active that would otherwise exit the fishery and will re-
duce resource rents that are generated under the IFQ program.
 A related finding concerns the mode of rent collection to administer the IFQ pro-
gram. Current program designs include 100% coverage of groundfish trips by on-board 
observers, with costs collected from participants in the IFQ program. The way these costs 
are collected has crucial implications for the operational fleet structure. Charging vessel 
operators directly for observer costs on a days-at-sea basis favors larger vessels. Large 
vessels harvest more fish per day than small vessels and thus incur lower observer cost 
per landed pound. Furthermore, collecting observer costs from active boats lowers prof-
its, which leads to a smaller IFQ-regime fleet and lower fleet harvests. If observer costs 
are collected through landings taxes, both the harvest quantity as well as the fleet size 
decline.3 The harvest decline, however, occurs only for the species with lower dock-side 
prices. When these taxes are uniformly levied on a per-pound basis, the effective price for 
low-value species drops relatively more, and its harvest decline is larger. Since smaller 
boats run closer to their physical harvest capacities, their costs (inclusive of taxes) rise 
relatively more under landing taxes. Once again, as a result landing taxes tilt fleet size 
toward larger vessels, albeit to a lesser extent than under the days-at-sea basis.
 Our article adds to a growing literature that has emphasized the gains in economic 
efficiency available under IFQ management programs (e.g., Grafton, Nelson, and Turris 
2005; Weninger and Waters 2003; Casey et al. 1995). We derive new insights concerning 
the role of IFQ program design on the nature of fleet composition and rent generation.4 
The results provide guidance for policy makers who must weigh the efficiency gains and 
distributional impacts that accompany a switch to rights-based fisheries management.
 The next section presents a conceptual model of the IFQ fishery and highlights the 
economic incentives that underlie an IFQ management program. We then summarize 
our analysis of inefficiency under the PCGF controlled access management program and 
present an overview of our calibration of groundfish harvest costs. A detailed discussion 
of the data and econometric methods used in calibrating the model is presented in an Ap-
pendix. We then investigate the equilibrium fleet structure and resource rents under an 
IFQ program in a dynamic fishery where total available harvests are uncertain. Key find-
ings are summarized in a concluding section.
The Model
We will consider a multiple-species IFQ management program. To fix ideas, we begin 
with a static and deterministic analysis; fleet structure in a dynamic uncertain harvesting 
environment is examined below.
 The manager issues species-specific permits which grant their owner a right to har-
vest specified quantities of fish.5 Production periods are distinguished with a subscript t. 
The total permits issued and thus the total allowable harvest in period t is denoted Qmt for 
3 Current law limits the Federal government’s ability to collect fees to a maximum of 3% of the ex-vesssel value 
of fish harvested under the program, regardless of the actual cost of the program.
4 Grafton (1992) studied the impacts of alternative rent capture methods in rights-based fisheries. Grafton 
(1994) examined the effects of fish price uncertainty. To our knowledge, the impacts of total allowable catch 
uncertainty and rights-based program design on fleet composition, harvesting activity, and rent generation has 
not been examined.
5 Amendment 20 to the Groundfish Fishery Management Plan, which is currently in development, allocates har-
vest rights as shares of total allowable catch levels. Modeling harvest rights as quantities simplifies our presenta-
tion and has no effect on the results.
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species m=1,...,M. The biomass in the fishery is denoted Xmt for species m. Catch cannot 
exceed biomass and thus, Qmt≤Xmt for all m.6
 Denote the quantity of species m fish landed by vessel operation i in period t as qimt. 
We assume that the manager is able to monitor the total landings in the fishery. Total land-
ings cannot exceed total available permits: 
 ∑1qimt ≤ Qmt,  for all m = 1,...,M, for all t. (1)
To simplify notation we will hereafter consider a representative production period. We 
also let ),...,( 1 MQQQ = denote the vector of total harvest permits, ),...,( 1 MXXX = de-
notes the vector of stocks, ),...,( 1 iMii qqq =  denotes the harvest vector of vessel i, and 
),...,( 1 Mppp = denotes the vector of dockside prices.
 Variable fishing costs for operator i are defined over the harvest vector iq : 
 ci (qi,ki,X) = minz (w'z | (z can harvest qi given ki, X),
where z is a vector of variable factors of production (e.g., fuel, labor, bait, and ice), which 
we assume are purchased competitively at price vector w, and ki denotes the capital 
employed by vessel operation i. The subscript on variable costs captures heterogeneity 
in cost efficiency of individual vessel operations. We explicitly allow for heterogeneity 
due to the vessel skipper’s efficiency and cost differences across vessel sizes or lengths. 
Variation in skipper skill levels can be important in fisheries, and, therefore, may be a key 
source of cost savings under IFQ management (Squires and Kirkley 1995; Weninger and 
Waters 2003). The implications of IFQ operating rules on the cost efficiency of different 
vessels lengths are of particular interest and are investigated thoroughly below.
 It is useful to contrast minimum costs under IFQ management with costs under a 
controlled access management program. Under the latter, the maximum number of active 
vessel operations is fixed through entry permits. Because limiting the number of vessels 
alone does not ensure the harvest constraint in equation 1 is met, additional restrictions on 
vessel harvesting activities are required. In general, a combination of entry permits along 
with restrictions on harvesting operations will not align fleet size with individual vessel 
harvests in a cost-efficient manner.
 IFQ management, on the other hand, aims to control directly the total harvest in 
the fishery. We assume that there are no restrictions on IFQ ownership and that the IFQ 
program is closed in the sense that harvest of all fish species requires IFQ permits (the 
implications of caps on quota ownership is considered below). These assumptions imply:
( , , ) ( , , )IFQ LEi i i i i ic q k X c q k X  .      
In other words, harvesting costs for an identical harvest vector qi, for a given level of 
capital, stock abundance, and skill level, can only decline under IFQ management as 
various restrictions (e.g., gear restrictions, bimonthly landings restrictions) utilized under 
controlled access management are eliminated.
 The total profit for vessel operation i is given as πi(qi,ki,X)−fci where fci denotes the 
fixed cost of operation i, and πi(qi,ki,X) is the variable operating profit: 
 πi = pqi – ci(qi,ki,X).
6 Managers may face additional constraints on harvest choices. For example, the Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Con-
servation and Management Act prohibits setting harvest levels that exceed overfishing levels (see MSFCMA 2007).
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 The decision to be an active participant in the IFQ-managed fishery must consider 
two opportunity costs: the cost of the vessel capital, fc, and the harvest permit user cost. 
The latter cost exists with IFQ management because harvest permits are tradable. To see 
this formally, suppose the manager issues species-specific permits that grant the right to 
harvest Qm units of species m fish, m = 1,...,M. The owner of harvest permits is the re-
sidual claimant of the excess profit that can be generated by harvesting and selling fish. 
High-cost vessel operations will earn less profit than low-cost vessels and will face an 
incentive to sell their permits and exit the fishery.
 Assume that a well-functioning permit trading market emerges under IFQ manage-
ment. let ),...,,( 21 Mrrrr = denote the vector of permit lease prices. For all active vessel 
operations in the IFQ fishery the following conditions must hold in equilibrium: 
  
       πi(qi,ki,X) – fci – r'qi ≥ 0, (2)
iallforrp
q
c
mm
im
i    ,−=
∂
∂
MmforQq mimNi IFQ
,...,1  ==
∈∑ ,                                                
where NIFQ denotes the set of active vessel operations.
 The first condition states that all active vessels must earn non-negative profits, where 
profits explicitly include the per-period permit holding cost, r'qi. The second condition in 
equation 2 ensures that the gains from permit trades among active vessel operations are 
exhausted. The third condition is simply a restatement of equation 1.
 The conditions in equation 2 reveal three sources of cost savings are expected when 
controlled access management is replaced with IFQs. First, lifting the restrictions on har-
vesting activities will lower harvesting costs for all vessels. Second, per-unit harvesting 
costs are expected to fall under IFQs as the harvesting responsibilities gravitate to the 
most cost-efficient operators in the vessel population. Third, vessels that are active under 
IFQs will exploit available economies of scale and scope in production.
Efficiency Analysis and Cost Calibration
Our empirical analysis has two goals. The first is to measure the extent of harvesting inef-
ficiency in the PCGF under the controlled access management program. The second goal 
is to estimate a structural model of trawl vessel harvesting costs that can be used to simu-
late the impacts of a switch to IFQ management. This section provides a brief overview 
of the data and econometric methods used. Further details are presented in the Appendix.
 Our data are from PacFIN (the Pacific Coast Fisheries Information Network) and a 
cost and earnings survey of limited entry trawl vessel owners conducted by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service and Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission for the 2003 
and 2004 groundfish harvest seasons. There are 111 unique vessels operations and a total 
of 130 annual cost and landings observations in our data.  Since it was not feasible to es-
timate our model with the over 80 different species of groundfish reported by PacFIN, we 
aggregated groundfish into three groups based on location of catch, season of catch, and 
per-pound value of catch. Our analysis aggregates the over 80 species of groundfish re-
ported by PacFIN into whiting, the DTS group (Dover sole, thornyheads, and sablefish), 
and non-DTS species.
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 A stochastic cost frontier approach is used to estimate differences in variable harvest-
ing cost efficiency. Costs for vessel operation i are assumed to follow: 
               ci(q,k,X) = vic(q,k,X)ε,                                                  (3)
where c(q, k, X) is the deterministic cost frontier, vi ≥ 1 is a measure of cost inefficiency 
for operation i, and ε > 0 reflects the stochastic component of the cost frontier. To es-
timate equation (3) we require a functional form for variable costs and distributional 
assumptions for the efficiency and stochastic components.7 An exponential function is 
specified for variable costs, cf(.) = exp(.). The exponential function is simple, parsimoni-
ous, and strictly positive—properties that offer advantages for our simulation exercise.8 
Distributional assumptions for the inefficiency and the stochastic components of costs 
follows Hadri (1999) (see Appendix for additional discussion).
 The cost function estimation results conform to expectations with one exception; re-
sults indicate that the fuel price coefficient is negative with p-value = 0.072. We are fairly 
confident that this perverse sign is the result of aggregation in our fuel price data (see Ap-
pendix for additional discussion).
Cost Inefficiency
Following jondrow et al. (1982), we calculate the conditional expected value 
]|[ evvEv iii +=
∧
. Cost inefficiency is then obtained as exp( ).iv

 Figure 1 reports vessel/
year-specific efficiency scores along with 95% confidence intervals (Horrace and Schmidt 
1996). The results suggest substantial cost inefficiency for a small portion of the fleet, al-
though the lower bound of the confidence interval lies close to the frontier value of unity 
for most observations. The inefficiency analysis suggests that cost savings in the form of 
pure efficiency gains can be expected under an IFQ management program, as the bulk of 
the harvest responsibilities are transferred to the most productive vessels in the fleet.
Scale Economies
We next consider cost savings expected under the IFQ management program due to unre-
alized economies of scale. A useful measure of multi-output economies of scale is given 
in Panzar and Willig (1977): 
             ci(qi,ki,X) + fci            Si =       .                                                           ∑mqim∂ci (qi,ki,X)/∂qim
In the above, Si >1 indicates economies of scale exist at harvest vector qi, whereas Si <1 
indicates diseconomies of scale at qi. Si = 1 indicates constant returns at harvest vector qi.
 We calculate Si for all vessels in our sample using estimated variable plus fixed op-
erating costs (see Appendix). We divide the sample into vessels that operate in a region 
7 Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell (2000) provide a comprehensive discussion of stochastic frontier theory and 
estimation methods.
8 Linear and log-log specifictions provided inferior fits to our cost data. It should be noted that the exponential 
function imposes the structural property of homotheticity. Although beyond the scope of the current study, a 
flexible functional form could be used to test the structural properties of groundfish harvest technology (Kirkley 
and Strand 1988).
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of increasing returns, constant returns, and decreasing returns to scale. The results indi-
cate that of the 62 sample vessels observed in 2003, 3 operated in a region of decreasing 
returns, 8 operated at constant returns, and 51 operated in a region of increasing returns 
to scale. The 2004 sample observations indicate that 5 vessels operated in a region of de-
creasing returns, 12 operated at constant returns, and 51 operated in a region of increasing 
returns to scale. For vessels operating under increasing returns, average cost per unit of 
harvest will decline if the scale of production is increased. Note that this is precisely what 
is predicted to occur in the groundfish fishery as the current system of bimonthly catch 
limits is replaced with IFQs.
Figure 1.  Estimates of Cost Inefficiency with 95% Confidence Intervals
 In sum, the analysis of scale efficiency suggests fleet downsizing under the proposed 
IFQ management. As more catch is consolidated onto fewer vessels, average costs per landed 
pound of groundfish is expected to fall due both to increases in scale economies and a redis-
tribution of the harvest from the least to the most efficient vessels in the fleet. The combined 
effect will be a reduction in the total costs required to harvest the aggregate groundfish catch 
in the fishery, or alternatively an increase in the resource rent generated in the fishery.
Potential Cost Savings under IFQ Management
We next use the model to assess the potential cost savings in the fishery if the controlled 
access management program is replaced with IFQs. Our approach is to estimate the 
minimum efficient scale of production for different vessel types (each vessel type is a 
different length). We then calculate average harvesting costs for representative vessel 
types (lengths) that operate at minimum efficient scale of production and attain a reason 
able level of cost efficiency. An individual vessel efficiency level of              =1.215 is ( )iexp v

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assumed, which is the median value estimated from our sample. The resulting cost esti-
mates are then compared to estimates of the actual costs incurred by our sample vessels 
under the controlled access program to obtain an estimate of the potential for cost savings 
under IFQs. 
 Table 1 reports estimates of minimum efficient harvest scale, calculated as the har-
vest that minimizes ray average cost (RAC), and associated RAC, for six vessel length 
classes.9 The table also reports estimates of the fleet costs, cost savings, and fleet sizes 
under a scenario in which the 2004 groundfish catch is harvested by a fleet consisting of 
cost efficient operations of different length classes (see Appendix for details). The results 
can be viewed as a first approximation to the fleet restructuring and efficiency gains ex-
pected in the PCgF under IFQ management. We estimate the harvest cost savings as the 
difference between the sample RAC of $0.657 per landed pound and RACs reported in 
table 12. Predicted costs and cost savings are reported in 2004 dollars.
9 RAC is defined as c(λq, k, X)/λ for scalar λ ≥ 1 (see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982).
Table 1
Minimum Cost of Harvesting 2004 Groundfish Catch
            Catch/Vessel and Harvest Cost                           Cost Savings and Fleet Size
                           Catch/Vess.           Fleet Cost
           Len.             (MES)             RAC           ($Mill.)           $ Mill.             %   Vessels
1 40 500,000 0.341 20.180 18.609 49.97 119
2 50 850,000 0.266 15.692 23.097 59.55 70
3 60 1,323,900 0.275 16.231 22.559 58.16 45
4 70 1,326,000 0.333 19.669 19.120 49.29 45
5 80 1,330,800 0.419 24.757 14.032 36.18 45
6 90 1,342,800 0.493 29.148 9.641 24.85 44
Note: MES is minimum efficient scale, RAC is ray average cost. Fleet size is calculated by dividing the 2004 
groundfish harvest by the RAC-minimizing harvest.
 The results in table 1 can be interpreted as follows. Consider the 40-foot representa-
tive vessel length. If the entire PCGF fleet were made up of 40-foot vessels, the fleetwide 
costs are predicted to be $20.180 million in 2004. This represents a cost saving predicted 
at $18.609 million, which represents 49.97% of the costs estimated to have been incurred 
in 2004. To harvest the entire 2004 catch (excluding whiting) with a fleet consisting 
entirely of 40-foot boats, 119 vessels would be utilized. Moving to larger vessels, the 
results indicate that the cost savings are largest for fleets consisting of 50- and 60-foot 
vessels. Cost savings under these vessel lengths are in the range of $23 million, which is 
almost 60% of the 2004 costs. The number of vessels required to harvest the 2004 catch 
is estimated at 70 and 45 for the 50- and 60-foot length classes, respectively. PacFIN data 
reveal that 117 non-whiting groundfish limited entry trawlers were active in 2004 (num-
ber excludes 26 vessels that targeted primarily whiting). Correspondingly, the results in 
table 1 indicate that considerable fleet downsizing is expected under IFQ management as 
vessels consolidate the harvest and exploit available economies of scale.
 Further calculations provide some additional insights on the economic conditions 
under controlled access regulations. Assuming a 10% annual return to the vessel capi-
tal investment, estimates indicate that the 2004 groundfish fleet incurred a total cost of 
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$38.789 million. The PacFIN data indicate fleetwide revenue at roughly $36.275 million 
in 2004, and, therefore, fleetwide losses of $2.514 million. Based on a lower 5% annual 
return to the vessel capital, the results suggest that the groundfish fleet merely broke even 
in 2004; i.e., dockside revenues were offset by the fleet-wide total harvesting costs. Neg-
ligible resource rents under controlled access regulations are consistent with what one 
would expect, which lends credibility to our cost calibrations. nevertheless, the simula-
tion results that follow should be interpreted in the context of data constraints that the 
calibration exercise encountered.
Fleet Structure and Fishery Value under IFQ Management
This section predicts the equilibrium fleet structure, harvesting costs, and fishery rents 
that are expected to emerge under an IFQ management program. Based on the above 
analysis of the cost and earnings survey data, fleet size and costs are expected to decline. 
The magnitude of these changes will depend on the form that the IFQ program takes; e.g., 
the species that are included in the IFQ program, restrictions on the transferability of har-
vesting permits, or the approach used to recover program administrative costs. It will also 
be affected by the TAC levels announced by the fishery managers and the randomness 
in the announced TACs over time. This section first estimates a random harvest model 
which captures the randomness in TAC that is likely to prevail in the IFQ-managed fish-
ery. We combine the estimated harvest costs and random harvest model into a dynamic 
model of the PCGF. The model predicts equilibrium fleet structure, harvesting costs, and 
rents expected under uncertain TACs.
Random Harvest Model
Growth, natural mortality, and thus total stock abundance and allowable harvests are 
influenced by random fluctuations in the marine environment. Changing environmen-
tal conditions are likely to cause fluctuations in the TAC targets in the PCGF. Because 
variation in the TAC from year to year has implications for fleet size and fishing profits, 
we require a model that reflects the normal variability of these factors. A parsimonious 
biological model that captures abundance and growth for all harvested groundfish spe-
cies (more than 80 in all) is difficult to conceive. We assume simply that the management 
rules which determine annual TACs are not altered significantly by the introduction of an 
IFQ program. We approximate temporal adjustments in groundfish TACs from observed 
harvests reported in the 1994-2006 PacFIN data. Specifically, we assume that the TAC of 
groundfish species m follows: 
 
,'' mmm QzQ =
 
  (4)
where mQ  is the average TAC for species m, and z'm is a unit-mean multiplicative random 
shock. The random shock z'm is contained in the interval, ],[ mm zz , where mm zz <<0 . 
Species-specific shocks follow a first-order autoregressive process: 
  
 z'm = ςm + ρmzm + η,     m = 1,...,M, (5)
where                      ςm + ρm = 1, and η is an independently and normally distributed distur-
bance with zero mean and finite variance σ2η. Hereafter, we refer to equations 4 and 5 as 
the harvest transition model.
[ 1,1],mρ  
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 To estimate the parameters of the harvest transition model, we obtained annual land-
ings data from the PacFIN database for 1994-2006. Annual landings for the groundfish 
fleet in the PCGF for m = 6 species groups are shown in figure 2.
 Visual inspection of historical landings indicates a declining catch for some ground-
fish species (e.g., DTS and non-DTS species groups). To ensure that catch trends do not 
influence the estimates of the harvest transition model, we assume the period t annual 
landings of species group m fish follows: 
Figure 2.  Landings by Major Species Groups: 1994-2006
., tbaQ mmtm +=
The parameters of the model ςm, ρm, am, bm, m = 1,...,M are estimated using feasible gener-
alized non-linear least squares following Judge et al. 1985 (see pp. 483-90). 
 Table 2 reports the parameter estimates along with the actual and predicted harvest 
for 2004. We see that the harvest of each species is positively serially correlated. It is also 
seen that the magnitudes of the ςm and ρm do not much differ across species groups. We 
estimated a restricted version of the shock transition equation in equation (5) in which  ςm 
= ς and ρm = ρ  for all m. Based on the results of a likelihood ratio test, we failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that the random shocks follow a common process (the chi-square sta-
tistic is 0.071 with critical value 11.07). The results of the restricted model yield estimates 
of ς = 0.698, ρ = 0.303, and σ = 0.300.
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Dynamic Model of Fleet Structure and Fishery Rent
Our model of dynamic fleet adjustment closely follows Singh, Weninger, and Doyle 
(2006). The dynamic program is summarized by the following Bellman equation:
 
 
subject to: njIkk jjj ,...,1 ,
' =+= , 
 
and subject to equations 4 and 5. In the above functional equation, β is the discount fac-
tor; kj denotes the number of vessels of length class j; qj denotes the harvest vector vessel 
class j vessel; fcj is the fixed cost of a vessel of class j; πj(.) is the variable harvesting 
profit; Ij  is the number of new boats of class j inducted in the fleet and pkj is the class j 
vessel price. Finally, Ez'|z  is the expectation of the one-period-ahead shock conditional on 
the current shock.
 Standard numerical techniques are employed to solve the above program by guessing 
an initial V(.)  and then iterating it to convergence (Judd 1998). The reader can also refer 
to Singh, Weninger, and Doyle (2006) for technical details.
Results
This section presents the results from the dynamic model of the IFQ-managed groundfish 
fishery. We first examine fleet structure, costs, and rents under a baseline scenario which 
imposes no restrictions on the transferability of harvesting permits across vessels and col-
lects no program administrative costs. We then consider the effects of: i) a limit on the 
share of the total quota that can be harvested by individual vessels; ii) limits on harvest 
permit transferability across vessel classes; and iii) two forms of fee collection to pay for 
program administrative costs.
 The results that follow assume that active IFQ-regime vessels target groundfish spe-
cies only. The added costs required to switch gear types and keep abreast of the most 
 
'
1, 2
' ' ' '
'| 1 2
{ , } 1 1
, ,..,
max ( , , ) ( , , ,..., ) ,
j j
n
n n
j j j j j kj j z z n
k q j j
V z k k k
k q k X fc p I E V z k k k 
 

        
 
2004Q
Table 2
Harvest Transition Model: Parameter Estimates
 
Species                             ςm                          ρm                     Q2004  
   
Whiting 0.49 0.51 197.69 178.98
DTS 0.53 0.47 23.25 24.23
Non-DTS 0.44 0.56 21.24 24.45
Crab 0.78 0.22 8.02 7.09
Shrimp 0.68 0.32 5.11 14.43
Other 0.74 0.26 1.46 1.43
Note: Total harvest in 2004 is in millions of pounds.
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productive fishing sites for other species are avoided if vessels specialize in groundfish.10 
Active IFQ-regime boats are assumed to harvest DTS and Non-DTS species and a small 
quantity of the Other species group as bycatch. Our baseline scenario assumes further that 
the cost of moving a vessel in and out of the PCGF is 25% of the total vessel value and 
that the market interest rate is 5%.
 Low-cost vessels will be able to profitably bid harvest permits away from higher 
cost operators. For this reason, the IFQ-regime fleet will favor mid-sized vessels 60-70 
feet in length. However, this conclusion ignores idiosyncratic variation in harvesting per-
formance that is likely to be a factor in the current groundfish fleet. Any vessel that can 
match the cost performance of the most efficient boats in the fleet will remain active. The 
results that follow, which assume fleets consisting of homogeneous “representative ves-
sels,” should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
 Table 3 reports results for three different TAC scenarios. Reported values are the 
means of the respective invariant distributions obtained from the solution to the dynamic 
fleet adjustment model (Judd 1998).
 Case 1 assumes average TAC levels equal to the total landed pounds in the 2004 
PacFIN data (23.25 million pounds of DTS, 21.24 million pounds of Non-DTS, and 1.46 
million pounds of Other Species). In case 2 the annual TACs increase to 40.57 million 
pounds for DTS and 24.57 million pounds for non-DTS. Case 3 assumes annual average 
TACs of 40.57 million pounds for DTS and 35.53 million pounds for Non-DTS ground-
fish. It should be noted that the model assumes a constant ratio of DTS and non-DTS 
TAC levels. The effects of annual variations in the ratio of the two species groups is not 
captured in our model.
 Our results reveal that a mix of 60- and 70-foot vessels are able to generate the high-
est profit levels. The model predicts an IFQ-regime fleet consisting of vessels 60 to 70 
feet in length. Investigation reveals that 70-foot vessels have a higher physical capacity 
(1.95 million pounds per year) than that of 60-foot vessels (1.5 million pounds per year). 
Larger vessels have larger per-trip hold capacity and are capable of fishing in more severe 
weather. The static results in the previous section suggest that 70-foot boats incur higher 
costs per landed pound than 60-foot boats. However, 70-foot boats land more fish annual-
ly, which can provide an economic advantage particularly in a fishery with varying TACs 
(see Appendix for additional discussion). It follows that the relative cost efficiency of 70-
foot vessels increases as the TAC% of non-DTS species increases. This explains why the 
number of 70-foot boats is increasing in the relative (to DTS species) TAC of non-DTS 
species as reported in table 3. Of course, when the TAC of all species is increased as in 
Case 3, the fleet size across all efficient boat classes increases. 
 The results suggest a switch from the current controlled access management program 
to IFQs could yield a significant increase in resource rents in the PCGF. For instance, 
our analysis finds that the 2004 groundfish catch generated zero resource rent. Instead, it 
could have yielded a substantial positive rent at $13.574 million (see table 3).
 It is instructive to examine our results within the context of the capacity utilization 
literature.11 Segerson and Squires (1990) identify alternative measures of capacity for 
multiple-product firms. One convenient measure is the harvest level that minimizes the 
long-run ray average cost for a fishing vessel. The previous section (table 1) reports, for 
vessel length classes 60 feet and above, an estimate of this capacity measure.12 The catch 
10 Based on discussion with industry members, it is reasonable to assume that there are returns to specializing in 
whiting and returns to specializing in groundfish species. This implies the existence of scope dis-economies in the 
joint harvest of whiting and groundfish species. Similar arguments hold for the harvest of shrimp and crab. These 
species are not harvested jointly with groundfish species and are not included under the proposed IFQ plan.
11 There is a large body of literature that examines capacity utilization in ocean fisheries. The reader is referred 
to Pascoe et al. (2003) and references cited therein.
12 The MES harvests for 40- and 50-foot vessels is determined as a physical capacity measure; i.e., the maxi-
mum amount harvested per unit of time under normal operating conditions (Johansen 1968).
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per boat estimates reported in table 3 represent the per-vessel harvest levels that would 
be observed, on average, under an IFQ program for groundfish and a fully cost-efficient 
fishing fleet. For example, if TACs were maintained as in Case 1 of table 3, the model 
predicts vessels 60-feet in length would harvest 1.225 million pounds of groundfish per 
year, on average. Seventy-foot boats would harvest 1.320 million pounds of groundfish 
per year, on average. These estimates are optimal capacity levels under the stochastic 
conditions assumed in our model.
 Notice that for a 60-foot boat, the optimal harvest capacity under uncertainty and 
costly capital adjustment is roughly 89% of the static minimum efficient harvest scale ca-
pacity (compare results in table 1 and table 3). The explanation is the following. Because 
it is costly to adjust the size of the groundfish fleet, the optimal (rent maximizing) fleet 
structure in an uncertain environment involves variation in per-vessel harvest levels and 
therefore deviations from the static minimum efficient harvest scale from year to year. 
Our model optimally balances the costs from further adjustments in the fleet size with 
the costs of varying the annual harvest per boat, thus increasing the average costs per 
harvested pound. For example, it may not be worth investing in additional capital in the 
event of moderately favorable but nonpermanent stock conditions. It may be preferable to 
increase the harvest per boat and incur a moderate increase in per-vessel average harvest 
costs in order to save capital adjustment costs (Singh, Weninger, and Doyle 2006).
Table 3
Fleet Size, Harvest Cost, and Rent under IFQs
Case 1:  DTSQ  = 23.25, NDTSQ  = 21.24
  
        Fleet      Vessel Activity       % TAC Harvested     Permit Prices          Rent
Boats     Len. Catch/Boat  Prof./Boat   DTS  Non-DTS    λDTS          λNDTS       Rent/Yr.
28.46 60 1.225 0.492 100 94.3 0.433 0.264 13.574
7.06 70 1.320 0.463      
      
Case 2:  DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 24.57
        Fleet      Vessel Activity       % TAC Harvested     Permit Prices          Rent
Boats       Len.     Catch/Boat  Prof./Boat   DTS  Non-DTS     λDTS          λNDTS      Rent/Yr.
52.05 60 1.182 0.478 99.99 93.0 0.433 0.264 20.368
2.00 70 1.274 0.453      
  
Case 3: DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 35.53
        Fleet      Vessel Activity       % TAC Harvested     Permit Prices          Rent
Boats       Len.     Catch/Boat Prof./Boat     DTS Non-DTS     λDTS         λNDTS            Rent/Yr.
49.24 60 1.225 0.481     100 94.1 0.434 0.265 22.408
10.81 70 1.314 0.458  
Note: Boats are annual averages. Catch/Boat and Prof./Boat is in millions of pounds and millions of $2004,  re-
spectively. Lease prices are in $2004. Rent/Yr. is in millions of $2004.
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harvest Permit Trading Restrictions
Restrictions on the concentration of quota ownership and/or restrictions on harvest permit 
trades across vessel classes are often incorporated into IFQ program design.13 These re-
strictions may address ancillary social objectives. However trading restrictions of any sort 
will reduce the rent that is generated in an IFQ-managed fishery. This section investigates 
the effects of two common forms of harvest permit trade restrictions, quota ownership 
caps, and restrictions on permit trading across vessel classes.
Quota Ownership Caps 
To demonstrate the implications of quota ownership caps we simulate the equilibrium 
fleet structure and rent generation under a 1% limit on the total quota that is harvested by 
a vessel. Case 1 in table 4 shows the effect of a 1% quota share ownership cap for DTSQ  = 
40.57 and NDTSQ = 24.57. The 1% cap restricts the total pounds that can be landed by ac-
tive vessels and effectively restricts the fleet size to be no less than 100 boats. The model 
predicts that the most preferred vessel length is now 50 feet, rather than 60- and 70-foot 
vessels as in the unrestricted case. Logically, 50-foot vessels have lower fixed operating 
costs and achieve a smaller average cost at the restricted catch levels that are implied by 
the 1% cap. In addition to altering the preferred vessel length, the 1% quota ownership 
cap results in a loss of $3.651 million (17.9%) in annual fishery rent. This is because the 
fleet is maintained at an inefficiently high number of smaller boats.
 Case 2 of table 4 maintains the 1% quota share ownership cap but assumes higher 
average TAC conditions in the fishery; DTSQ  = 40.57 and NDTSQ  = 35.53 (counterpart to 
Case 3 in table 3). Interestingly, the equilibrium fleet is now comprised of roughly equal 
mix of 50- and 60-foot boats. While tight quota caps favor smaller boats, larger average 
TACs leave some room for the use of cost-efficient boats and thus 60-foot boats are back 
in use. The quota ownership cap places an artificial limit on the annual harvest for active 
vessels. The model shows that this causes fluctuations in fleet size that did not occur in 
the unrestricted fishery. These unnecessary adjustments in fleet size are costly and detract 
from the total rent generated in the fishery. The results find that relative to the unrestricted 
case, annual rents decline by $3.649 million (16.3%).
 The Draft Environmental Impact Statement to Amendment 20 limits the total pounds 
of groundfish that can be harvested by a single vessel during each fishing season (PFMC 
2008). Limits vary across individual groundfish species ranging from 2.7%–20% of the 
total pounds for the particular species. The regulation specifies, in addition, an aggregate 
groundfish (per-vessel) pound limit at 3.2% of the aggregate groundfish TAC. This regu-
lation effectively places a lower bound on the number of active vessels at 31.25 boats. 
Results reported in the previous section indicate that in the absence of per-boat catch 
limits, the equilibrium number of vessels that make up the groundfish fleet will be above 
this mark. However, our model indicates that the 3.2% limit can have implications for the 
optimal vessel size and resource rents. Naturally a per-vessel harvest pound limit is more 
likely to bind for larger boats under low TACs. Simulations conducted under our smallest 
TAC scenario (DTS–23.25 million pounds and Non-DTS–21.24 million pounds) indicate 
that a 3.2% harvest limit raises the average number of 60-foot boats by 3.29 annually (to 
31.75), decreases the average number of 70-foot boats by 2.7 annually (to 4.36), and re-
duces annual rent by about $14,000 annually.
13 See Dinneford et al. (1999), Grafton (1996), and Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas (1999) for 
a discussion of design elements of rights-based fishery managment programs.
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 Amendment 20 further restricts the total quota shares that can be legally controlled 
by a group of individuals with controlling interest.14 Quota ownership share limits range 
between 2.5%–10% depending on the groundfish species. The aggregate groundfish quota 
share limit (whiting excluded) is set at 2.7%.
 Implications of quota share ownership restrictions may depend on the social network 
in the groundfish fishery. If the groundfish fleet is characterized by independent, single-boat 
owner/operators, a 2.7% quota share cap would translate to a lower bound of 37 separate 
controlling interests. Whether each interest is a single vessel owner/operator is difficult to 
know. If controlling interests operate multiple-vessels, ownership share constraints may 
bind. For example, our model predicts that a firm that operates two boats will likely have to 
lease quota in order to fully exploit the available economies of scale in the fishery.
Permit Trading Restrictions Across Vessel Classes
Table 5 reports the effects of a restriction on permit trading across vessel classes. For ex-
ample, the Pacific halibut fishery IFQ program restricted quota share trades from smaller 
to larger vessel classes (trading in the opposite direction; i.e., from larger to smaller ves-
sel classes was permitted). 
 The results in table 5 are not surprising. In particular if 50% of the TAC must be 
harvested by 50-foot boats, 65 such boats are active in the fleet. The optimal number of 
60-foot vessels falls from 49.24 (see Case 2 in table 3) to 14.59. Overall, the trading re-
striction reduces the rent in the fishery by $2.120 million per year (9.46%). The results for 
Case 2, which allocate 50% of now a larger TAC to 50-foot boats, increase the number of 
these vessels even further and cause further reductions in the fishery rent.
Table 4
Restrictions on Per-Vessel Quota Ownership
Case 1:  DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 24.57 with 1% Quota Ownership Cap
  
         Fleet         Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested               Rent
Boats     Len.   Catch/Boat   Prof./Boat       DTS     Non-DTS    Rent/Yr.   Rent Loss
100 50 0.645 0.262 100 94.2 16.717 3.651 
           
 
Case 2:  DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 35.53 with 1% Quota Ownership Cap
         Fleet         Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested               Rent
Boats       Len.        Catch/Boat  Prof./Boat       DTS     Non-DTS     Rent/Yr.   Rent Loss
49.53 50 0.708 0.308     100 93.4 18.759 3.649
50.46 60 0.776 0.277     
  
Note: Boats are annual averages. Catch/Boat and Prof./Boat is in millions of pounds and millions of $2004, re-
spectively. Lease prices are in $2004. Rent/Yr. is in millions of $2004.
14 The Amendment states (page 15): “Quota share controlled by a person shall include those registered to that 
person, plus those controlled by other entities in which the person has a direct or indirect ownership interest, as 
well as shares that the person controls through other means.”
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Observer Costs, Landing Fees, and Optimal Fleet Size
Here we examine the impact of landing fees collected to support an on-board observer 
program. While about 25% of groundfish trawl trips had observers during 2004, observer 
coverage will be mandatory on all trips under the proposed IFQ program. This is because 
quota is designated for the vessel catch rather than landings, thus making it necessary to 
measure the catch on trawl trips. We first consider a fee that is levied equally on all boats 
on a per-day (at sea) basis. It is assumed that the cost per observer is $350 per day.15 The 
results that follow are based on an estimate of how many days per year a boat will be at 
sea when employed to its full physical capacity: 
Length (feet) 40 50 60 70 80 90
Full Capacity Days at Sea 100 130 150 160 170 170
 Based on the above estimates, table 6 shows the effects of a $350 per day fee on fleet 
structure, vessel harvest levels, and rent generation. 
 A uniform per-day fee on all vessels tilts the optimal fleet size towards bigger boats, 
simply because the cost per-pound increase from adding the observed charge is smaller. 
As is evident, while in the no-fee case the average fleet size of 60-foot and 70-foot ves-
sels are about 52 and 2, respectively, with the daily observer charge the average number 
of 60-foot and 70-foot boats is 28 and 22, respectively. Also notice that not only are a 
higher number of 70-foot vessels hired, but their mean catch levels also rise, while the 
catch of 60-foot vessels declines. As a result, the profitability (net of observer costs) of 
70-foot vessel increases considerably, whereas the profit of 60-foot boats falls.
Table 5
Permit Trading Restrictions across Vessel Classes
Case 1:  DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 24.57, 50% of Quota Allocated to 50-foot Boats
  
         Fleet          Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested                Rent
Boats     Len.   Catch/Boat   Prof./Boat       DTS      Non-DTS    Rent/Yr.   Rent Loss
65 50 0.745 0.324 99.99 89.34 18.248 2.120
14.59 60 1.016 0.334 
           
 
Case 2:  DTSQ  = 40.57, NDTSQ  = 35.53,  50% of Quota Allocated to 50-foot Boats
         Fleet                     Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested               Rent
Boats       Len.        Catch/Boat  Prof./Boat        DTS     Non-DTS     Rent/Yr.   Rent Loss
75 50 0.746 0.310     100 91.45 19.787 2.621
17.5 60 1.013 0.315     
  
Note: Boats are annual averages. Catch/Boat and Prof./Boat is in millions of pounds and millions of $2004, re-
spectively. Lease prices are in $2004. Rent/Yr. is in millions of $2004.
15 Estimates of daily observer costs were provided by Merrick Burden (Pacific Fisheries Management Council 
staff) and Jonathan Cusiak (manager of the observer program at the Northwest Fisheries Science Center).
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 Table 7 shows that the percentage TAC harvested is almost unaffected by the per-day 
observer charge. Clearly, as a part of the rent must go towards paying for observers, the 
lease prices of both species is now smaller. However, the lease price of non-DTS species 
drops less, since fees favor higher catch boats which are relatively more efficient in har-
vesting non-DTS species. 
Table 6
Implications of Landing Taxes to Fund Observers
Case 1: No Charge for Observers
             Fleet                                 Vessel Activity                           Rent
Boats            Len.      Catch/Boat         Prof./Boat          Rent/Yr.
52.05 60 1.182 0.478 20.368
2.00 70 1.274 0.453 
    
Case 2: $350/Day Observer Charge
             Fleet                      Vessel Activity  Obs. Cost/        Rent
Boats            Len.          Catch/Boat     Prof./Boat       Boat        Rent Loss    Obs. Fees
27.44 60 1.087 0.506  0.038 2.170 2.231
21.81 70 1.585 0.540  0.046 
Note: TACs are set at DTSQ  = 40.57 and NDTSQ  = 24.57. Boats are annual averages. Catch/Boat and Prof./Boat is in 
millions of pounds and millions of $2004, respectively. Lease prices are in $2004. Rent/Yr. is in millions of $2004.
Table 7
Implications of Landing Taxes to Fund Observers
Case 1: No Observer Fee
         % TAC Harvested                                                              Permit Prices
DTS                      Non-DTS                             λDTS                                    λNDTS 
  
99.99 93.30 0.433  0.264
   
Case 2: With $350/Day Observer Fee
        % TAC Harvested                                                               Permit Prices
DTS                      Non-DTS                             λDTS                                    λNDTS  
 
100.00 94.11 0.417 0.257
Note: TACs are set at DTSQ  = 40.57 and NDTSQ  = 24.57. lease prices are in $2004. 
 The rent reduction of $2.170 million (10.65%) is due to the payments to observ-
ers and changes in production. The mean of total observer payments are calculated to 
be $2.234 million, and therefore the changes in production due to distortions amounts 
to $0.064 million per year. Note that our model does not consider any benefits provided 
by the observers (such as improved data on total catch for stock assessment); calculated 
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losses are likely to be smaller or even turn into net benefits if the benefits provided by the 
observers are taken into account.
 We next consider alternative ways to raise funds for supporting an observer program. 
The first is a per-pound landings fee of $0.033, while the second is an ad-valorem landing 
set at 7% of the dockside price (table 8). These rates generate total fees roughly equal to 
those obtained under the per-boat observer fee considered above (table 6). 
 The two fee-collection schemes yield almost identical outcomes in terms of their effect 
on fleet structure. Relative to a per-day observer charge, the boats employed now are closer 
to the no-fee scenario (see table 6). However, fees still favor larger vessels. Why? Notice 
that 60-foot vessels operate relatively closer to capacity in comparison with larger vessels. 
Since fees are based on harvest quantities, the relative benefits of 60-foot vessels decreases.
 It is also worth noting that while the %TAC harvest of DTS species is unchanged 
relative to the no-fee case (as well under per-day fee), the %TAC harvest of non-DTS 
species declines by almost 2.5% (1.3%) under an ad-valorem fee. The reason is simple. A 
landing fee of $0.0325 per pound decreases the effective price of DTS species by about 
6.5%, whereas for non-DTS species the decline is about 11%. Ad-valorem fees affect all 
effective prices in the same proportion. However, to the extent that the TAC of non-DTS 
species was not being harvested fully even with no-fees, a lower effective price depresses 
its harvest even further.
Table 8
Implications of Landing Taxes to Fund Observers
Case 1: With $0.033/lb. landing Fee 
         Fleet          Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested       Rent
Boats     Len.   Catch/Boat   Prof./Boat       DTS      Non-DTS    Rent/Yr.    Tax Rev.
42.86 60 1.239 0.468 99.99 90.83 2.219 2.206
7.67 70 1.332 0.441 
           
Case 2: With 7% Dockside Price Landing Fee
         Fleet                     Vessel Activity             % TAC Harvested        Rent
Boats       Len.        Catch/Boat  Prof./Boat        DTS     Non-DTS     Rent/Yr.    Tax Rev.
42.35 60 1.228 0.463     99.99 92.00 2.184 2.060
8.89 70 1.319 0.441     
  
Note: TACs are set at DTSQ  = 40.57 and NDTSQ  = 24.57. Boats are annual averages. Catch/Boat and Prof./Boat is in 
millions of pounds and millions of $2004, respectively. Lease prices are in $2004. Rent/Yr. is in millions of $2004. 
Conclusions
This article examines the economic implications of adopting an IFQ management pro-
gram for Pacific Coast limited entry trawl non-whiting groundfish. An important focus of 
our analysis is the implications of the IFQ program design on the composition of the fish-
ing fleet and the resource rents that are generated in the fishery. The conceptual approach 
follows recent work by Weninger and Waters (2003) and Singh, Weninger, and Doyle 
(2006). We first estimate cost inefficiency in 2003–04 cost data collected from groundfish 
vessels under the controlled access program. Vessel-level costs are then incorporated into 
a dynamic optimizing framework to study equilibrium fleet structure and composition un-
der an IFQ program. We then make alternative policy predictions.
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 Our results suggest that the trawl groundfish fleet, which consisted of 117 vessels 
during 2004–05 under controlled access, will be reduced by roughly 50–66% to 40–60 
vessels under an IFQ program. This reduction in the fleet size will result in cost savings 
in the range of $18–$22 million annually (all values are in terms of base year 2004). The 
results predict that smaller and larger vessels will exit, leaving mid-sized vessels (60- to 
70-feet in length) to carry out the bulk of the harvesting activities. The vessels that remain 
active will, on average, be more cost efficient and will benefit from economies of scale 
that are currently unexploited in the fishery. The cost savings estimates are significant, 
amounting to roughly 60% of costs incurred currently. The results suggest IFQ manage-
ment may be an attractive option for the PCGF.
 However, if the IFQ program design places additional restrictions on permit trad-
ing, such as caps on vessel level harvests or restrictions on permit trading across vessel 
classes, the cost savings will be smaller. In general, tight harvest quota ownership caps 
for individual vessels will favor smaller boats. Restrictions on permit trading across ves-
sel classes will keep vessels active that would otherwise exit the fishery. Both forms of 
trading restrictions will reduce rents that are generated under the IFQ program.
 We have also examined the implications of funding observers through “days-at-sea” 
and landing taxes for the optimal fleet size as well as harvest outputs. In general, both 
taxes favor larger vessels. While days-at-sea fees only distort the optimal mix of the active 
fleet, landing taxes by affecting relative dockside prices, distort both the fleet structure and 
harvest quantities. As a result, net of tax revenues, losses under landing taxes are higher. 
This suggests that funding observers through a days-at-sea fee is relatively more efficient. 
To the extent that such fees favor larger boats, a progressive capacity-based, days-at-sea 
fee may perform even better. Further work to identify rent collection schemes that can ad-
dress specific management objectives should prove useful (Grafton 1992, 1994).
 Overall, our results show that the specific design elements in IFQ fisheries man-
agement program can have important implications for the nature and extent of fleet 
restructuring. We find that commonly used design elements, such as quota trading restric-
tions and rent collection, to pay for administrative costs will favor certain capital types, 
and will therefore have redistributive implications during transition to a rights-based 
management program. Insights drawn from our analysis provide guidance for regulators 
concerned with the distributional and efficiency impacts of fisheries management reform.
 Our analysis has focused on estimating changes in fleet structure and cost savings 
when controlled access regulation is replaced with IFQs. Additional impacts, such as 
changes in product quality, safety conditions, discarding, and costs of management, may 
also be important (Branch, Rutherford, and Hilborn 2006; Casey et al. 1995; Committee 
to Review Individual Fishing Quotas 1999). An analysis of these impacts is reserved for 
future work.
 Lastly, additional challenges (e.g., determining which species are included in the IFQ 
program or the extent of the observer coverage) may be encountered in the design of IFQ 
management for Pacific Coast groundfish (Squires et al. 1998; Grafton, Nelson, and Tur-
ris 2005). Our estimates reveal that substantial rent gains are available if these challenges 
can be addressed.
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Appendix: Data and Cost Function Estimation
This appendix describes the data and the econometric methods used to estimate harvest-
ing costs and inefficiency under the controlled access management program in the PCGF.
Data
A survey of fishing expenses for the limited entry trawl fleet during 2003 and 2004 was 
conducted by the National Marine Fisheries Service in cooperation with the Pacific States 
Marine Fisheries Commission. Data collected includes: i) annual expenses for captain, 
crew, fuel, ice, bait, provisions, and vessel repair and maintenance; ii) revenue sources 
other than landings on the Pacific Coast (which are available through PacFIN); iii) physi-
cal characteristics of the vessel such as length, engine horsepower, fuel capacity, and fuel 
consumption; iv) how frequently the vessel owner serves as captain of the vessel; and v) 
the share system used to remunerate the captain and crew. By combining survey data with 
data available on Pacific Coast landings through PacFIN, it is possible to get a complete 
picture of revenues and costs for each vessel.
 Survey responses were received from 111 of the 151 vessels active in the limited 
entry trawl component of the PCGF during 2004. Two factors prevented the use of data 
from some survey respondents in this study. First, some survey respondents failed to 
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provide expenditure data for key cost categories or provided unreasonable data. Second, 
some vessels landed a large component of their annual catch in Alaskan waters. Avail-
able data did not allow us to separate the reported costs into Pacific Coast expenditures 
and expenditures incurred in Alaskan waters. Removal of vessels with missing cost data, 
unreasonable cost data, or a significant portion of their revenue from Alaskan waters re-
duced the number of observations to 62 in 2003 and 68 in 2004.
Fixed Costs
Fixed costs incurred by vessel owners include: i) expenditures on gear and vessel repairs, 
maintenance, and improvements; ii) the rental price of vessel capital; and iii) payments 
to the vessel captain. We assume that skilled captain labor cannot be costlessly moved 
in and out of the groundfish fishery. Captain labor is therefore included as a component 
of the capital endowment and subject to costly seasonal adjustment.16
 We require estimates of the fixed cost components for different capital types. Our 
data contain complete information on vessel lengths and fuel capacity. Therefore, we use 
these two characteristics as proxies for the capital embodied in our vessel operations. 
Alternative functional forms (linear, quadratic, cubic, log-log, etc.) that map cost com-
ponents of observable vessel characteristics were investigated. We report results from 
functional forms that were parsimonious and provided a reasonable fit to the data.17
 Survey respondents provided expenditures as well as explanations for gear and vessel 
repairs, maintenance, and improvements. Hereafter, this expense category will be denoted 
mr (maintenance and repair). Reported mr expenses varied widely across vessels due to 
the fact that some vessel owners made expensive engine repairs or replaced engine or 
drive train parts. It is clear from the data that these types of repairs are incurred only oc-
casionally.
 We estimate the following simple model to obtain an expected value for the mr ex-
pense category: 
ln(mr) =   –6.616   +   0.069 x len   –   2.87e–4 x len2   +   3.5e–5 x fuel_cap,
                 (0.654)          (0.016)              (1.03e–4)                    (0.8e–5)           (6)
where len is length and fuel_cap is fuel capacity of vessel i. Ordinary least squares is used 
to estimate the above model using reported costs from 91 vessels with complete data over 
two seasons, for a total of 182 observations. Estimated parameters have low standard 
errors (reported in parentheses), and each is statistically different from zero at the 99% 
level of confidence. The adjusted R-square for the model is 0.481, reflecting the consider-
able variation in this expense category.18
 A second component of annual fixed cost is the rental price of the vessel capital. Our 
data include survey respondents’ self-assessments of the sale value of their vessel (45 ob-
servations). To smooth idiosyncratic differences in reported values, which we denote pkj, 
we conduct a least squares regression to obtain the following equation:
16 Active vessels under the IFQ program are assumed to harvest groundfish year round in order to exploit all 
available economies of scale. The assumption that captain labor services are non-malleable is therefore reason-
able for the scenario that we consider.
17 We note that other proxies for capital, such as vessel gross registered tonnage, hull construction, engine type, 
and electronic equipment were unavailable for additional discussion of measurements of fishing capital) (see 
FAO (1999). We have no reason to believe that the proxies and functional relationships that we specify will bias 
our calibration of harvesting costs in any way.
18 A dummy variable for 2004 was included in an earlier regression but found to have no significant effect on 
maintenance and repair costs.
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pk =   0.931   –   0.032 x len   +   3.16e–4 x len2   +   1.3e–5 x fuel_cap   +   8.4e–5 x Dlen>100
        (0.595)          (0.018)               (1.25e–4)                    (1.0e–5)                     (4.4e–5).   (7)
The parameter estimates in equation (7) also have low standard errors (each parameter is 
statistically different from zero at the 99% levels of confidence). The adjusted R-square 
for the model in equation (7) is 0.935.
 Among survey respondents, slightly over 80% of trips targeting groundfish are made 
with the vessel owner serving as captain. Examination of the survey data revealed that 
the reported skipper wage paid to the owner/operators of a vessel; i.e., the wage that the 
owner paid himself was, in some cases, a token payment that did not reflect a true market 
wage. These token payments are not comparable to the wage paid to hired skippers. This 
data anomaly is caused by individuals who serve as both the vessel owner and vessel cap-
tain, choosing to take their compensation as residual vessel profits. To reduce the effect of 
this data anomaly on the analysis, we assume the vessel captain is paid the median wage 
in our data, which is $80,000 annually.
 Combining the above results yields an annual fixed cost estimate for the groundfish 
vessels in our data: 
                                                  fck = cap_wage + mr + ρpk                              (8)
where cap_wage is the captain wage and mr and pk are the fitted values obtained from the 
above regression models (recall that ρ is an annual interest rate). 
Variable Operating Costs
Industry sources indicate that trip-level landings are influenced largely by the demand for 
fish from groundfish processors. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the objective 
of vessel owner/operators is to minimize the costs of landing the groundfish quantities 
demanded by processors. We assume further groundfish harvest costs are influenced by 
the skill level of the vessel skipper and randomness associated with fishing in an uncer-
tain marine environment. Stochastic frontier econometric methods are well suited for 
estimating harvesting costs under these assumptions. A summary of the stochastic frontier 
model is available in Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell (2000). Our econometric specification 
closely follows Hadri (1999).
 Empirical tractability requires that fish species be aggregated into output groups. 
Industry participants and managers were consulted to identify species that are harvested 
using similar gear, at similar depth, and in similar geographical regions.19 It was deter-
mined that six output groupings provide a reasonable balance between model tractability 
and potential inaccuracy resulting from aggregation. Our species groups include: i) whit-
ing; ii) DTS groundfish species (Dover sole, thornyheads, and sablefish); iii) non-DTS 
groundfish species, which include all groundfish species not included in the whiting and 
DTS groups; iv) crab; v) shrimp; and vi) other, which includes salmon, halibut, highly 
migratory, and pelagic species. Harvested quantities within each output category are ag-
gregated linearly. The aggregation procedure assumes that optimal input choices required 
to harvest these output groups can be chosen independently of the mix of species within 
each group or alternatively that the harvest technology exhibits weak output separability. 
Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of product transformation among species that 
make up each output group.
19 There are over 82 separate species of groundfish listed in the Fisheries Mangement Plan.
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 We proceed under the maintained hypothesis that the trawl harvest technology is 
joint-in-inputs (Lau 1978; Squires 1987a,b for additional discussion of joint-in-inputs 
technologies). First and foremost, the factor services that are provided from a fishing 
vessel and its crew during a particular calendar period must be viewed as a fixed but al-
locatable input (Shumway, Pope, and Nash 1984). We are further convinced that single 
species production and cost functions do not exist in our empirical setting due to the non-
selectivity of the trawl gear; i.e., groundfish fishermen may have considerable latitude to 
alter the mix of species that is intercepted with their gear, but they cannot costlessly spe-
cialize in the harvest of single groundfish species (Branch and Hilborn 2008). 
 Table 9 reports descriptive statistics from 2001-2006. The fleet is divided into Whit-
ing and non-Whiting or Groundfish vessels.20 Whiting is harvested with mid-water trawls 
as opposed to bottom trawls which are used to harvest most other groundfish species. Ves-
sels targeting whiting tend to be larger and harvest considerably more pounds per trip and 
per year than do vessels targeting groundfish species. Moreover, fishermen indicate that 
they are able to target whiting almost exclusively. PacFIn data supports this claim. We 
find the share of whiting landings for vessels that target whiting is often in excess of 0.90 
and, in some cases, as high as 0.99. Catch patterns in the data are consistent with feed-
back from industry that consider whiting boats a separate segment of the groundfish fleet. 
Comparing trips and landings per vessel per year in table 9 highlights the differences 
between whiting and groundfish vessels. In particular, the average and maximum land-
ings in pounds for whiting vessels is an order of magnitude larger than for non-whiting 
groundfish vessels.
 Table 9 reveals further information about the structure of the groundfish fleet 
under the current management regime. First note that the number of vessels reporting 
landings dropped markedly in 2004. The cause of this decline was a government- and 
industry-sponsored vessel buyback program which permanently retired 91 trawl limited-
entry permits.21 The effect of the buyback, which reduced the number of limited entry 
permits from 274 to 183, is evident in table 9. The mean number of trips taken and the 
harvest per vessel declined during 2001-2003 prior to the buyback (this may explain why 
the buyback program was supported by managers and industry) and increased during the 
post buyback period, 2004-2006.
 A final noteworthy aspect in table 9 is the variation in the trips per year and the an-
nual harvest among active vessels. For example, the maximum harvest quantity in many 
years is 3-5 times larger than the per-vessel average. The standard deviation of trips and 
landings is also high, indicating considerable variation in landed pounds. Some of this 
variation is explained by differences in vessel sizes and mix of target species. A second 
explanation, however, is variation in vessel capacity utilization, which is common in 
fisheries managed under limited-entry programs (Weninger and Waters 2003; Singh, 
Weninger, and Doyle 2006).
 Variable operating costs for a representative vessel in our sample (as above we avoid 
vessel subscripts to ease notation) are assumed to follow: 
                              lnck = β0 + ∑ βmqm + βw ln wt + βkk + βzz + βxxt + v + ε,                 (9)
where qm is an m-vector of landed quantities, wt is the fuel price in year t, k is a measure 
of vessel capital, and z denotes other exogenous factors that may impact variable har-
vesting costs. The fuel price is entered logarithmically to accommodate the input-price 
concavity property of the cost function. The unknown parameters are {β0, βm, βw, βk, βz, 
20 Whiting vessels are delineated as those harvesting less than 100,000 pounds of groundfish species annually.
21 A description of the buyback program appears in Federal Register Volume 68 number 138 May 29, 2003, pp. 
31653-31677.
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βx}. Following the stochastic frontier literature, we append an additive composed error 
term to the right-hand side of equation 9.
Table 9
Whiting and Groundfish Fleet Catch Statistics: 2001-06
Whiting Boats
Year     Boats      Ave. Trips      Std. Trips      Ave. Land.   Std. Dev. Land.  Max. Land.
2001 28 45.6 19.5 6,066.3 3,126.6 14,304.7
2002 28 33.9 15.3 4,077.1 1,710.8 7,369.7
2003 32 34.1 14.2 3,185.8 1,478.2 8,101.8
2004 26 52.6 17.6 7,928.3 3,262.4 15,001.7
2005 29 48.0 14.8 7,688.5 3,022.6 14,845.4
2006 34 41.7 18.0 6,018.0 2,960.7 14,803.7
Groundfish (non-whiting) Boats
Year     Boats      Ave. Trips      Std. Trips       Ave. Land.  Std. Dev. Land.  Max. Land.
2001 234 32.8 21.0 327.4 256.6 1,224.1
2002 231 33.5 22.5 372.6 319.6 1,902.0
2003 226 31.2 22.8 337.3 261.3 1,643.4
2004 143 35.0 24.9 433.8 358.6 2,269.3
2005 140 35.3 23.7 446.6 310.2 1,528.7
2006 137 35.7 22.6 421.3 257.1 1,110.9
Note: Ave., Std., and Max. denote average, standard deviation, and maximum values, respectively. Whiting 
boats land more than 100,000 pounds of whiting per year. Harvest quantities are thousands of pounds.
 We use two proxies for vessel capital; vessel length and fuel capacity. The fuel capac-
ity variable is included as a proxy for the power of the vessel’s engine and an indication 
of the size of net that can be dragged through the water and the quantity of fish that can 
be winched to the vessel deck and hauled back to port.
 The components of z include the proportion of time that the vessel owner serves as 
captain and the latitude of the vessel’s home port. The ownership variable may capture 
differences in productivity that result from ownership structure. For example, hired skip-
pers tend to be full-time fishermen who, due to the fact that they spend more time at sea, 
may develop better knowledge about the location of high concentrations of groundfish. 
The latitude variable is included as a proxy for possible differences in stock abundance 
across geographical regions or differences in average steaming time from port to the fish-
ing ground. It should be noted, however, that vessels are mobile; if certain regions of the 
fishery are more productive than others and information about abundance flowed freely 
among fishermen, vessels would likely relocate to more productive regions. The inclusion 
of the latitude measure may, however, capture short-run or out-of-equilibrium differences 
in regional productivity.
 Data on abundance of all groundfish species stocks are unavailable. To capture un-
observed stock effects, we replace βx with β2004 and interact this parameter with a dummy 
variable that is set to unity in 2004 and zero otherwise. Limitations of missing stock data 
are discussed below.
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 Heteroskedasticity (which is common in panel data) can bias the analysis of 
inefficiency in stochastic frontier models (Caudill, Ford, and Gropper 1995). Heteroske-
dasticity may be particularly prevalent in commercial fishing data. Table 9, in particular, 
reveals considerable variation in the number of annual fishing trips taken in the ground-
fish fishery. If one postulates that the catch on each trip is partly random due to unforeseen 
weather conditions and/or stock abundance, the law of large numbers would suggest that 
the variance of the two-sided error, σ2ε, will be larger for vessels taking fewer trips. Het-
eroskedasticity in the asymmetric error component may also be important. For example, 
some vessels may target a different mix of species from year to year which could impact 
the ability of the skipper to consistently locate targeted fish. The doubly-heteroskedastic 
cost frontier framework of Hadri (1999) is adopted to capture these elements.
 The symmetric error is denoted ε and is assumed to be independently normally dis-
tributed with zero mean and finite variance; ε ~ N(0,σ2ε). The asymmetric error term v 
captures the cost inefficiency of harvesting operations. We assume that ν is distributed as 
a half-normal random variable with variance σ2v. We assume σε = exp(θ0+θ1trips), where 
trips is the number of trips taken during the fishing year. Similarly, we assume σv = 
exp(γ0+γ1div), where div is a measure of diversification in the species mix. We compute 
div as the sum of squared landing shares. Thus a vessel that specializes in the harvest of 
one output group only would have div = 1, whereas vessels that target a mix of output 
groups would have a lower value for this variable. 
 Parameter estimates are reported table 10. The parameters associated with harvest 
of the six species groups β1 through β6 are positive, and with the exception of the other-
species group parameter β6, are statistically different from zero at or above the 95% 
confidence level. The marginal harvesting costs are calculated as ∂c/∂qi = c·βi. Marginal 
cost estimates are consistent with information provided by industry and average dockside 
prices in the fishery. The marginal cost per pound of whiting, which is the highest volume 
species, is lowest at $0.012 (the average dockside price for whiting obtained from the 
PacFIN data base is $0.046). Marginal costs for the deeper water DTS group is $0.154 
(average dockside price is $0.523).22 The marginal cost for the non-DTS species group, 
which is harvested from shallower waters, is estimated at $0.069 (average dockside price 
is $0.305). Our results find that the marginal cost for crab which, based on feedback from 
industry, is a more labor intensive fishing activity, is $0.358 (average dockside price is 
$0.624). Lastly, the marginal cost for the Other species group is estimated at $0.230, with 
average dockside price of $1.085.
 The parameter associated with the fuel price variable, βw, is negative with a p-value 
of 0.072. If this result is not a type II statistical error, it implies that the conditional output 
(Hicksian) demand for fuel is increasing in the price of fuel, which violates our main-
tained hypothesis of cost minimizing behavior. There are alternative explanations for 
the perverse sign, the most likely being the assumptions that underlie the construction 
of our fuel price variable. Data limitations require that an annual average fuel price be 
used whereas fuel prices and consumption vary seasonally. During 2003-04, fuel prices 
increased gradually over the winter of 2003-04 before increasing dramatically in May 
2004. Second, our data report the home port of the groundfish vessel but do not indicate 
where and when the vessel operator purchases fuel. Vessels do not always fish near their 
home port and fuel prices vary along the West Coast, making it difficult to infer fuel 
prices actually paid by individual vessel operators. A third factor is that despite the rise in 
fuel prices that began in May 2004, the annual average prices differed by less than $0.05 
in 2003 and 2004. The small variation in fuel prices makes identification of the fuel price 
effect difficult. Lastly, fuel prices across regions are correlated with our latitude variable. 
22 A Tornqvist index is used to calculate the price of multiple species output groups. We then calculate the aver-
age price index across vessels that reported positive landings.
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The simple correlation between fuel price and latitude is −0.78.23 These considerations 
suggest that the perverse sign indicated for βw does not warrant a reconsideration of the 
cost-minimizing behavioral hypothesis.
 The results indicate that the latitude variable has a negative impact on variable costs 
but that the effect is not significantly different from zero. As noted above, our data do 
not indicate the location of fishing, which complicates the identification of regional ef-
fects if they do indeed exist. If vessels fish adjacent to their home port year round, we can 
conclude from our results that there are no significant differences in variable costs across 
geographical regions in the groundfish fishery.24
 The results suggest hired skippers incur lower variable costs than owner-skippered 
vessels. One explanation for this result is that hired skippers fish more and have better infor-
mation about the location of high concentrations of groundfish. Our data indicate that vessels 
with hired skippers harvest almost four times more fish per year than owner/skipper boats.
 The parameter associated with the 2004 dummy variable is negative and statistically 
difference from zero at the 99% confidence level, indicating that variable costs declined 
between 2003 and 2004. Several factors could cause this finding. First, any factor (bio-
logical or economic) that changed between 2003 and 2004 and is not accounted for in 
Table 10
Variable Cost Function Parameter Estimates
Parameter                Variable                                Estimate                 Standard Error
β0  Constant –1.816 1.382
β1  Whiting 0.054** 0.012
β2 DTS 1.285** 0.324
β3 Non-DTS 0.573* 0.233
β4 Crab 2.984** 0.364
β5 Shrimp 0.676** 0.227
β6  Other 1.916 1.487
βw ln Fuel Price –1.578* 0.878
βk  Vessel length 0.125** 0.047
βk Fuel Capacity 0.1758 0.079
βz latitude –1.431 1.064
βz Owner-as-skipper 0.271** 0.089
β2004 2004 Dummy var. –0.230** 0.070
θ0  Constant (σε) 0.058 0.185
θ1 Trips –1.204** 0.203
γ0 Constant (σv) –1.080** 0.399
γ1  div –0.240 0.401
Likelihood Function Value  –64.063
Note: A single (double) asterisk indicates parameter is statistically different from zero at the 95% (99%) confi-
dence level.
23 As a further check for multicolinearity we regressed the fuel price variable on a constant term, the latitude 
variable, and the 2004 dummy variable. This regression yielded an R-square statistic of 0.65.
24 This conclusion does not suggest that abundance is homogenous in the fishery, but that after controlling for 
proximity of the fishing grounds from port, weather, etc., we find no identifiable differences in costs per landed 
pound of fish across port latitude.
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the econometric model will influence the estimate of β2004 . One such factor may be the 
permit buyback program, which likely retired higher-cost vessels from the groundfish 
fleet. Another cause could be increased stock abundance in 2004. Independent estimates 
indicate that the stock levels for some key groundfish species (Dover and petrale sole) did 
increase between 2003 and 2004 (Lai et al. 2004; Stewart 2005). Without a comprehen-
sive account of abundance for all groundfish species, however, the true cause of the 2004 
cost decline cannot be determined.
 Turning to the heteroskedasticity terms, the results indicate σ2ε is a declining function 
of the number of trips taken per year. This relationship is as expected. We find no statisti-
cally significant heteroskedasticity in the variance of the asymmetric error term, σ2v.
Estimate Costs
Table 11 reports results for six vessel length classes: 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90-foot boats. 
Column 1 in table 11 reports the number of sample boats falling into each length class 
window. We determine fuel carrying capacity for a vessel of length L as the average fuel 
capacity for vessels of similar length. For example, a 50-foot vessel is assumed to be able 
to carry 2,587.6 gallons of fuel. This value is determined as the average fuel capacity for 
the 21 sample vessels with lengths ranging between 45 and 55 feet in length (estimates 
for the remaining length classes were obtained similarly). 
 Column 4 of table 11 reports estimates of the maximum annual pounds (a measure 
of physical harvesting capacity) for each vessel class. These estimates are obtained by 
examining the maximum landed pounds reported by each vessel category during 2003 
and 2004, historical maximum landings by vessel class, and consultation with groundfish 
fishermen. A problem we face is that recent harvest activity has been generated under bi-
monthly landings restrictions imposed under the Limited Entry management program. By 
design, these regulations restrict per-vessel harvest, which suggests that the annual land-
ings reported in table 2 will be low compared to the total landings under IFQs; i.e., when 
bimonthly catch limits are eliminated. Historical data generated before bimonthly limits 
could indicate the landings capacity under IFQ management. however, historical data 
will be conditional on stock conditions that prevailed in the fishery in past years. To cir-
cumvent this problem we consulted groundfish fishermen and all available data to settle 
on the capacity estimates reported in table 11. The sensitivity of the results to capacity 
constraint estimates is examined further below.
 Vessel value and maintenance and repair expenditures estimates (equations (7) and 
(6) above) are reported in columns 5 and 6, respectively. Notice that estimates of Ves-
sel Value indicate that 40-foot boats sell for $188,634, whereas 50-foot boats sell for 
$177,984. One would expect the relationship between vessel length and value to be 
monotonic. The violation of this relationship for 40-foot boats is likely due to estimation 
error caused by a low number of observations on smaller vessels. It should also be noted 
that the cost data include only four observations for vessels in excess of 85 feet in length. 
The results for the smallest and largest representative vessel classes should be viewed 
with this limitation in mind.
 For each vessel length class we calculate the harvest quantity that minimizes ray av-
erage cost (RAC). Note that RAC depends on the mix of harvested species. PacFIN data 
indicate that the 2004 Limited Entry fleet harvested 197.691 million pounds of whiting, 
23.246 million pounds of DTS species, 21.238 million pounds of non-DTS species, 8.018 
million pounds of crab, 5.112 million pounds of shrimp, and 1.457 million pounds of 
other species. Given our focus on non-whiting boats, we posit a target harvest vector that 
includes no whiting but positive quantities of the remaining five species groups, where 
the mix is set equal to the fleet-wide mix for these species.
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 A final required assumption is the level of cost efficiency attained by representative 
vessels. To investigate the role of inefficiency, we calculate the minimum efficient scale 
of production and corresponding RAC for the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentile values esti-
mated from our sample. 
 Table 12 reports the catch per vessel (total pounds of all species) and minimum RAC at-
tained for efficiency levels )exp(
∧
v  = 1.164, 1.215, and 1.264. As asterisk associated with the 
catch-per-vessel estimate indicates that the vessel’s physical harvesting capacity constraint binds.
 The results in table 12 show that the variation in cost efficiency has only small effects 
on the scale-efficient catch per vessel and RAC. Higher inefficiency lowers total catch 
and raises RAC as required. Comparing vessel lengths, the results indicate that RAC is 
lowest for 50-foot vessels, although the difference between 50- and 60-foot vessels is 
small. Results indicate that smaller (40-foot) vessels and larger (70-90 foot) vessels incur 
higher costs per harvested pound. The finding that larger vessels incur higher costs must 
be interpreted cautiously, as the analysis in this section is static and does not consider 
value of harvesting flexibility offered by larger boats, which is important in an uncertain 
fishing environment.
Table 11
Representative Vessel Costs and Characteristics
1                2                3              4             5              6
Obs.      Length         Fuel Cap.      Catch Cap.  Vessel Value ($)  Main./Repair ($)
10 <45 1,000.0 500,000 188,634 93,920
21 50 2,587.6 850,000 177,984 102,695
28 60 4,576.8 1,500,000 235,675 115,435
28 70 6,964.3 1,950,000 361,665 132,977
19 80 10,631.6 2,250,000 567,044                158,210
4 85+ 11,500.0 2,250,000 800,507                178,878
Note: Fuel Cap. denotes vessel fuel capacity in gallons; Catch Cap. denotes annual harvesting capacity in 
pounds; Main./Repair denotes annual maintenance and repair expenditures.
Table 12
IFQ-Regime harvest levels and Ray Average Cost Estimates
                                      =1.164                            =1.215                 =1.264
length          Catch     RAC            Catch     RAC           Catch           RAC
 
40 500,000* 0.337 500,000* 0.341 500,000* 0.346
50 850,000* 0.260 850,000* 0.266 850,000* 0.271
60 1,337,400 0.268 1,323,900 0.275 1,311,600 0.282
70 1,339,500 0.324 1,326,000 0.333 1,313,700 0.341
80 1,344,400 0.408 1,330,800 0.419 1,318,400 0.429
90 1,356,600 0.481 1,342,800 0.493 1,330,200 0.505
Note: RAC denotes ray average cost; * indicates the catch is equal to the physical capacity constraint. 
)exp(
∧
v )exp(
∧
v )exp(
∧
v
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 The RAC estimate obtained from the cost survey data is considerably higher than the 
minimum RACs reported in table 12. Three key factors can explain this difference. First, 
the RAC cost minimizing catch per vessel as predicted by our analysis is considerably 
larger than the actual catch per boat reported in the PacFIn database. PacFIn data indi-
cate that in 2004 the average total harvest per vessel was 433,800 pounds (see table 9). 
Table 12 suggests that 50- and 60-foot vessels attain a minimum RAC at a harvest that is 
roughly two times larger for 50-foot boats and three times larger for 60-foot vessels. In-
creasing the catch per vessel will reduce fleet size and, in turn, reduce the total fixed costs 
incurred by the groundfish fleet. Second, the analysis reveals that some capital types incur 
higher costs per landed pound than others. Results suggest that vessels in the range of 50-
60 feet in length attain the lowest RAC. Consolidating the fleet-wide groundfish harvest 
onto the most efficient vessels types will further reduce the cost per harvested pound of 
groundfish. A third source of cost saving arises in the form of a pure efficiency gains, al-
though our results reveal only modest cost inefficiency in the sample data.
Sensitivity to Model Assumptions
We next consider the sensitivity of the results to model assumptions, particularly the 
assumptions for physical harvesting capacity. We repeat the above analysis under the 
assumption that physical harvesting capacity is 25% lower than reported in table 1. The 
results indicate only small changes in the predicted costs savings (59.35%) under IFQs. 
note that the results in table 12 indicate that the physical capacity constraint does not 
bind for 60-90-foot length classes. Thus under a tightened physical capacity constraint, 
the model suggests an IFQ-regime fleet consisting of larger boats; however, only a 
slightly larger RAC ($0.267) is predicted. Relaxing the physical capacity constraint also 
has small effects on predicted cost savings under IFQs. A 25% increase in the physical 
capacity constraints raises the cost savings estimate to 64.82% of actual 2004 costs. We 
note that the cost savings estimates increase by roughly 1.5% when )exp(
∧
v =1.164 and fall 
by roughly 0.5% when )exp(
∧
v =1.264.
 A second factor that impacts the above results is the mix of groundfish species that is 
harvested by vessels. larger vessels have larger per-trip hold capacities and are capable 
of fishing in more severe weather. While the above results suggest that larger boats in-
cur higher costs per landed pound, they land more fish annually, which can provide an 
economic advantage, particularly in a fishery with varying annual harvest quotas. This 
advantage is demonstrated in figure 3.
 Figure 3 plots RAC surfaces for 60- and 70-foot vessels under different mixes of 
DTS and Non-DTS TACs. Beginning in the northwest panel (a) and rotating clockwise, 
the ratio of DTS to Non-DTS in the harvest vector is reduced from 3/1 to 1/3.
 RAC is lower on 60-foot vessels until the total catch reaches the 60-foot vessel ca-
pacity constraint at 1.5 million pounds. Additional physical harvest capacity on a 70-foot 
vessel can be an advantage in instances where the fishery manager announces a particu-
larly large TAC relative to the total harvesting capacity of the active groundfish fleet. In 
this event, harvesting additional fish on 70-foot vessels, even if this means harvesting fish 
at higher variable costs, may be preferred to adding additional boats to the groundfish 
fleet. The downside is that cost can rise sharply at high harvest levels, which offsets the 
advantages offered by the additional physical capacity.
 The figure demonstrates that the rate at which costs rise depends on the mix of tar-
geted species. Our cost estimates indicate that, relative to non-DTS species, DTS species 
not only have a higher marginal cost for any given vessel type, but that marginal costs 
increase more steeply than those of non-DTS species. As a result, when the ratio of DTS/
Non-DTS is high, as in panel (a), variable costs rise steeply, offsetting the returns from 
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utilizing large physical harvest capacity. Put another way, when costs rise sharply, average 
costs on larger capacity boats fall more slowly, reducing the relative advantage of larger 
vessels. The figure shows, however, that as the proportion of Non-DTS in the harvest mix 
increases, the cost surfaces flatten out. The upshot is that average costs per pound and 
value of harvesting flexibility offered on larger vessels will be more pronounced when the 
harvest mix is tilted toward non-DTS species.
Figure 3.  Cost, Capacity, and Species Mix
